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EXAMPLE 1 (POLICE INTERVIEW) 
Q: 	 But isn’t it the case, that you decided prior to approaching those men, to steal from 
them? 
A: 	 I . . . say yes . . . or what? [‘or what’ not transcribed by police] 
EXAMPLE 2 (POLICE INTERVIEW) 
Q: Yes. Can you describe those two men? 
A: Um – yeah. Yes. 
EXAMPLE 3 (TRIAL) 
A: 	 When the child came, I initially examined the patient and I noted the moistness of 
the tongue, sunken eyes, the skin color, and everything was okay. 
Q: 	 Are you suggesting that there were no sunken eyes? 
A: 	 No. 
Q: 	 I think we better slow down a little bit more and make sure the record . . . did you 
observe sunken eyes? 
A: 	No. 
❏	 In example 1, the interviewee shows clear signs of incomprehension and 
seeks help from the interviewer. Was the question posed to him difficult to 
understand? If so, why? 
❏	 Explain the witness’s response in example 2 in terms of direct versus indirect 
speech acts and language proficiency. 
❏	 In example 3, language habits from the witness’s first language may have 
affected how he responds to questions in English: in his first ‘no’ reply, is 
he answering the speech act or the propositional meaning of the question? 
What would have happened if the lawyer did not seek clarification? 
❏	 Is miscommunication avoidable in these circumstances? 
C10 
Activity ✪ 
SAME LAW, DIFFERENT TEXTS 
In this unit, we explore how courts resolve linguistic indeterminacy in bilingual and 
multilingual jurisdictions. Two legal cases are discussed. 
Arriving at a legal meaning 
Two major kinds of linguistic indeterminacy contribute to legal indeterminacy in 
statutory interpretation. Intralingual indeterminacy refers to uncertainties such as 
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those created by ambiguity (semantic, syntactic, referential, pragmatic, etc.), vagueness 
and generality. Interlingual indeterminacy arises when two texts do not completely 
correspond (i.e. there are discrepancies between texts). In two examples below, we gain 
a glimpse of strategies adopted in bilingual and multilingual jurisdictions to resolve 
each type of indeterminacy. 
Intralingual indeterminacy: is Perrier water a ‘carbonated 
beverage’? 
Having two or more legislative texts sometimes helps with interpretation, especially as 
regards intralingual indeterminacy. According to Beaupré (1986: 2–3), many cases 
would not have reached the courts ‘had the parties compared the two versions of the 
law in the first place’. 
Consider a Canadian case in which the main issue in dispute was whether Perrier, 
a carbonated mineral water sold in bottles or cans, should be taxed as a ‘carbonated 
beverage’ within the meaning of Schedule III of the Excise Tax Act. The following 
extract is taken from the judgment of Perrier Group of Canada Inc. v. Canada, delivered 
by Judge Linden. 
In resolving the dispute, the court referred first to dictionary definitions of beverage, 
and found that some dictionaries define it as excluding water while others simply define 
it as ‘a drink’. It also considered the relevant case law, which the court found 
inconclusive. The court then turned to the French version of the legislation: 
24 An analysis of the French version of the legislation is most helpful. Subsection 18(1) 
of the Constitution Act, 1982 states that the French and English versions of an Act are 
equally authoritative. This statement requires that, where the ordinary meanings of the 
French and English versions of a statute seem to point in different directions, the Court 
is obliged to choose an interpretation that best reconciles the wording used in both. 
MacGuigan J.A. commented on this obligation in Nitrochem Inc. v. Deputy Minister of 
National Revenue for Customs and Excise, [1984] C.T.C. 608, 53 N.R. 394 (F.C.A.), as 
follows: 
With respect to the reconciliation of English and French texts, a judge’s responsibility 
is not to seek some primary instance of ordinary usage in one language to which the 
meaning in the other language must be made to conform, but rather to try to grasp 
the whole meaning in both languages. 
25 The appellants have urged that we do what MacGuigan J.A. above suggests should 
not be done, that is, to accept “some primary instance of ordinary usage” in the English 
language version to which the French version would then be made to conform. The French 
version of section 1 uses “boisson” as the equivalent of three different English words 
used in the legislation, they being “drink”, “water” and “beverage”. Several observations 
may be made about this use of “boisson”. First, it is a term of general meaning. It is not 
like the English word “beverage”, which ordinarily connotes a more specialized sort of 
drink. 
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26 Rather, “boisson” ordinarily designates any kind of drink. Its primary definition given 
by Le Petit Robert1 is “Tout liquide qui se boit”. Translated, this definition means simply 
“a liquid suitable for drinking”. Water is certainly such a liquid. 
27 As a second observation, I note that the closest French equivalent to the English word 
“beverage” is not “boisson” but “breuvage”. This latter term, as its spelling suggests, is the 
etymological equivalent to “beverage”. One of the meanings of “boisson” set out in Le Petit 
Robert is “breuvage”. Not surprisingly, the popular meanings of the two words are very 
similar. Again as given by Le Petit Robert, the primary definition of “breuvage” is: 
1. Boisson d’une composition spécial ou ayant une vertu particulière. 
28 Translated somewhat literally, this definition reads: “A drink having a special 
composition (mix) or particular property (characteristic)”. 
29 What is important about this definition is not its exactly translated meaning, but the 
simple fact that a “breuvage” is a specialized form of a “boisson”. This much is plain from 
the definition and reinforces the first observation that the French version deliberately chose 
a term with a general rather than a specific meaning. 
30 Counsel for the appellants referred the Court to a document published by l’Office de 
la langue française in the Province of Quebec, where it suggests that the words “boisson 
gazeuse” be used to denote soft drinks or soda pop, and that “eau gazeuse” be employed 
to describe “les eaux minérales gazeuses”. This publication also stated “boisson englobe 
eau, eau n’englobe pas boisson,” which contradicts the submissions counsel made earlier. 
As interesting as this document is, and though it may be influential in improving French 
usage in the future, its advice, like that of the dictionaries, cannot bind this Court. Thus, 
in my view, since both versions of the legislation are equally authentic, and since we must 
adopt the meaning that both versions share, “beverage” and “boisson”, as used in the 
legislation, both mean any type of drink, including water. 
31 If a server in a Canadian restaurant asked a customer which “beverage” to bring and 
the customer responded, “Perrier, please”, would the server be surprised that the customer 
thought that Perrier was a beverage? I think not. Would the server respond to the 
customer saying, “Perrier is a water, and I shall bring it, but do you want a ‘beverage’ as 
well?” I think not. In our common speech, most Canadians, in my view, would include 
water, especially sparkling water, within the meaning of beverage, despite the many 
dictionary definitions excluding it. Similarly, if a server in French-speaking Canada asked 
what the customer wished as a “boisson”, the response “Perrier” would not surprise the 
server. No one would think that Perrier is not a “boisson”, despite the advice of the Office 
de la langue française. Though the word may not always be used to refer to water, 
therefore, I am of the opinion that it is more natural to interpret “beverage” as including 
water. 
This case is one of many instances where a Canadian court has resolved ambiguity 
contained in a legislative text by referring to another language version of the same text. 
Consider the following questions: 
C10 166	 E X P L O R A T I O N :  A N A L Y S E S  A N D  E X A M P L E S  
Activity✪ 
❏	 In para. 25, Judge Linden acknowledges that the English word beverage 
‘ordinarily connotes a more specialized sort of drink’ (than water). Then in 
para. 31, he presents a hypothetical scenario in which treatment of Perrier 
as a beverage would not contradict ordinary usage, in order to justify that 
beverage should be interpreted as including water. Do you think the scenario 
is consistent with or contradicts the earlier point? 
❏	 In para. 29, Judge Linden argues that the French version ‘deliberately chose’ 
a general rather than specific term. Why do you think he did not consider 
the rendering of beverage as boisson to be possibly a translation error? 
❏	 Was the shared meaning rule applied in this case? 
Interlingual indeterminacy: are boats vehicles? 
Now consider the EU case Fonden Marselisborg Lystbådehavn v. Skatteministeriet. 
Fonden Marselisborg Lystbådehavn (the Marselisborg Pleasure Boat Port Trust) is an 
independent institution based at the pleasure boat port of Marselisborg in Denmark 
that lets out water-based mooring and dry berths and land sites for storing boats during 
winter. The Sixth Directive referred to below is EU legislation that specifies a common 
list of VAT exemptions, which include, in Article 13B(b) of Title X, ‘the leasing or letting 
of immovable property’ excluding ‘the letting of premises and sites for parking vehicles’. 
The issue in dispute in this case was whether pleasure boats should be considered to 
be ‘vehicles’. 
41 The words used in the various language versions of Article 13B(b)(2) to designate 
‘vehicles’ are not consistent. As the Commission rightly stated, a number of language 
versions, among which are the French, English, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, German and 
Finnish versions, encompass means of transport in general in that definition, including 
aircraft and boats. On the other hand, other versions, such as the Danish, Swedish, Dutch 
and Greek versions, have selected a more precise term with a more limited meaning which 
serves to designate principally ‘land-based means of transport’. More particularly, the 
Danish word ‘kjøretøjer’ refers to land-based transport on wheels. 
42 In that connection it must be recalled that, according to settled case-law, where there 
is a difference between the language versions the provision in question must be interpreted 
by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms a part (see, 
in particular, Case C-372/88 Cricket St Thomas [1990] ECR I-1345, paragraph 19, and 
Case C-384/98 D [2000] ECR I-6795, paragraph 16). 
43 As regards the letting of premises and sites for parking vehicles, Article 13B(b)(2) of 
the Sixth Directive introduces an exception to the exemption laid down for the leasing 
and letting of immovable property. It thus makes the transactions to which it refers subject 
to the general rule laid down in that directive, namely that VAT is to be charged on all 
taxable transactions, except in the case of derogations expressly provided for. That 
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provision cannot therefore be interpreted strictly (see Case C-346/95 Blasi [1998] ECR I­
481, paragraph 19). 
44 Therefore, the term ‘vehicles’ used in that provision must be interpreted as covering 
all means of transport, including boats. 
45 Letting mooring berths for boats is not limited solely to the right to privately occupy 
the surface of the water, but also involves making available various port equipment for 
mooring the boat, landing-stages for the crew and the use of various sanitary or other 
facilities. As the Advocate General points out in paragraph 51 of her Opinion, none of 
the reasons, including the social ones, that originally justified allowing the exemption from 
VAT for immovable property may be applied to the letting of mooring berths for pleasure 
boats in the circumstances in the main proceedings. 
46 In those circumstances, having regard to the objectives of Article 13B(b) of the Sixth 
Directive, point 2 of that provision, which excludes the letting of premises and sites for 
parking vehicles from the exemption from VAT, must be interpreted as meaning that it 
is generally applicable to the letting of premises and sites for parking all means of 
transport, including boats. 
47 In the light of the foregoing, the answer to the second question must be that Article 
13B(b)(2) of the Sixth Directive is to be interpreted as meaning that the definition of 
‘vehicles’ includes boats. 
❏	 On what basis did the court decide that ‘vehicles’ must include boats? 
❏	 Do you think neither, either, or both of the following considerations should 
be relevant to a decision in this case? 
(a) What the ‘majority’ of the language versions say. 
(b) The fact that the case concerns a Danish company and that the Danish 
version of the Directive referred only to land-based transport on wheels. 
❏	 Based on this case, what advantages and disadvantages do you see in 
purposive (rather than narrower text-based) interpretation in a multilingual 
jurisdiction? 
Notes: 
* 	 The combined name and slogan, in a distinctive font with graphic embellishment, were 
registered as a trademark in the UK in 2008 (UK00002484595), for three classes of goods/ 
services: printed matter and publications; television advertising; and travel agency services 
(case details can be searched at www.ipo.gov.uk). 
1	 Le Petit Robert is a popular and widely used French dictionary. 
Activity ✪ 
